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STRATEGIES FOR TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN THE AMERICAS
Graciela Chichilnisky
Introduction: Trading Blocs and the GATT
Regional free trade zones have been unexpectedly successful in the last decade. Since 1980 the
European Community enlarged significantly its membership and its scope. It now includes southern
European countries, and market-integrating features allowing goods, people, services and capital to flow
freely around an area accounting for about one fourth of world economic output.
In what appears to be a strategic response, the United States has entered into similar agreements
with its neighbors. The recent trading and investment agreement with Canada was signed after many
decades of doubtful consideration, and the trend is expanding to the rest of the Americas starting with
Mexico. This trend is observed also in other regions. The six members ofthe Association ofSouth East
Asian Nations-Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei-have began this
year to build their ASEAN free trade area AFTA as a future counterweight to other international trading
blocks, even though at present most oftheir trade is with Europe, Japan and the US and not with each
other. The Japanese have increasingly focused their economic attention in their own region, leading to
more investment in and imports from the new East Asian manufacturing exporters. Eventhe Andeanpact
seems to be progressing in Latin America after several decades ofaimless discussions, with MERCOSUR
following suit.
The relationship betweenthe multilateral tradesystem (MTS) and thesuccess ofthe regional trade
pacts raise disparate reactions. One view is that the emergence of regional trade pacts is a step in the
right direction. In this view free trade is not defunct, but rather being organized and approached
differently.
￿
But another, quite natural, reaction is to fear that "customs unions," as regional free trade
pacts are usually called, are inherently opposed to global free trade. Do custom unions increase free
tradewith insiders atthe cost ofdiverting trade with outsiders? Since the classic works of Meade (1955)
and Viner (1950) classifying the issues into trade creation and trade diversion, there has been little
conceptual advance on this issue. But the issue is very alive today, and requires our full attention.
It is the purpose ofthis paper to re-examine the positive and negative aspects of trading blocs as
they relate to gains from free trade. The paper is primarily a discussion of conceptual issues, although
it is based on facts and on particular cases which are of interest to the trade liberalization in the
Americas.
We take a somewhat different approach to a familiar issue. Rather than asking the standard
question ofwhether regional blocs help or hinder global free trade, we ask a more detailed question: what
type of customs union is likely to lead to a trade war between the blocs, and what type ofcustom union
is, instead, likely to lead to expanded global trade. In practical terms: what type oftrade policies within
the blocs will provide economic incentives for expanding free trade.
We shall compare the impact on the world economy of free trade blocs organized around two
alternative principles: one is traditional comparative advantages, the other is economies of scale. The
aim is to determine how the patterns of trade inside the blocs determine the trade relations among the
blocs.
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Thepaper has four parts. The firstpart reviews the existing economics oftradingblocs, anduses
this to explain the current situation in the EC and NAFTA. The second part presents a new conceptual
approach to the economics ofpreferential trade, focusing onthe internal organization oftradingblocs and
the economic incentives that this generates with respect to the rest of the world.
￿
The third part is a
conclusion which pulls the arguments together for an evaluation ofNAFTA and an American free trade
zone, and of global free trade.
￿
The fourth part is an Appendix which provides a formal general
equilibrium model of trading blocs with increasing returns to scale and proves the mathematical results
which underlie the discussion in the text.
The last ten years have seen new developments in international trade, focusing on the study of
economic dynamics and ofmarket imperfections leading to strategic issues ingame theory and industrial
organization.
￿
But the central tenet of the theory remains the Pareto efficiency of the static and
competitive world market. In competitive markets, free tradeleads to Pareto efficient allocations. There
is no way to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. This is a general
proposition which holds for several countries and several markets interacting with each other
simultaneously. Called the first theorem of welfare economics, the result that static competitive markets
have Pareto-efficient equilibria seems to loom the larger, the more special cases ofmarket imperfections
are pointed out.
In view of the efficiency of competitive markets, the failure ofthe NITS to bring countries to an
agreement about a world of free trade seems, at a first sight, irrational . It would appear that countries
act as if they could, but prefer not to, achieve a Pareto efficient allocation.
￿
Indeed, some believe that
the failure of GATT is simply a version of the well-known prisoners' dilemma. The words "prisoners'
dilemma" are used to describe a generically inefficient situation, one which, with appropriate
coordination, can be altered so as to increase the welfare of each and all players.
Such a view would be incorrect. The problems derive not from irrational behavior, nor from a
lack ofcoordination or "prisoners' dilemma." The reason is that while free trade in competitive markets
leads to Pareto optimal solutions, free trademay not leadto Pareto efficient allocations whenthe countries
are large and have market power. For example, large countries may freely choose the quantities they
export in order to manipulate to their advantage world market prices, much the same way that a
monopolist freely chooses to supply a quantity that maximizes its profits considering its impact on prices,
inducing Pareto inferior allocations. For free trade to be Pareto efficient markets must be competitive,
and countries must have no market power. When countries are sufficiently large to have an impact on
market prices, then they often have an incentive to impose tariffs on each other.
Furthermore, under classical assumptions, a move from tariffs to free trade will typically make
some countries better off but other countries worse off. It is true that if a competitive allocation were
reached, it would be Pareto efficient. But in a world with tariffs, as we have today, under traditional
assumptions some country will loose if free trade is adopted.
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One may ask why large countries have protectionist incentives? The reason is that it is possible
for large countries to improve their welfare by improving their terms of trade. This is ofcourse not true
in competitive markets where the traders, by definition, have no impact on prices. But the theory of
trade proves that under traditional assumptions, a large country does have an economic incentive to
impose tariffs on others. This is the standard theorem on the existence of optimal tariffs, which is
discussed in more detail in Part II, below. A tariff can improve the terms oftrade of a large country,
even though it may distort its production and consumption. What the theorem says is that, under
traditional assumptions, there is always anoptimal tariff, one at which the gains from improving its terms
of trade through tariffs exceeds the losses due to distortions.
￿
A textbook analysis of a simple case is
found, for example, in Krugman and Obsfelt (1988). This theorem is widely accepted, understood and
applied.
The argument in favor ofoptimal tariffs is not true for small countries. It is essential that the
country should be large enough to have the ability to have an impact on prices . Furthermore the larger
is the country, the more market power it has, and the more it can gain from imposing tariffs on others .
The implication of this is that if a world of small competitive economies merges into a few trading
blocks, then under traditional assumptions, after the blocks are formed, there are more incentives for
imposing tariffs than before. In other words, regional free trade associations, under traditional
conditions, lead to protectionism.
￿
The optimal tariff which we have just discussed is imposed by one
country on others unilaterally.
￿
The theorem does not consider the possibility of retaliation by other
countries. But what if they retaliate? What if other countries also impose tariffs in response?
We now move to a world of strategic considerations, a world with tariff wars.
￿
Each country
imposes tariffs on each other, and does so strategically so as to maximize its welfare given the actions
of others. The outcome of this tariff game was studied in Kennan and Riezman (1988, 1990). If each
country chooses as its tariff the best response to the others', a market equilibrium with tariffs is reached.
We call this an optimal tariff equilibrium to distinguish it from the free trade equilibrium.
In an optimal tariff equilibrium some countries are better off than they would be at a free trade
equilibrium, Kennan and Riezman (1988, 1990) and Riezman (1985) . In other words, not all countries
would benefit ifthe world wereto move from the optimal tariff equilibrium into a world with free trade.
Furthermore, these works show that the larger the country, the more it can improve its welfare at the
optimal tariff equilibrium from the level that it could achieve at a free trade equilibrium
To a certain extent the current situation in the world economy can be described as an optimal
tariff world. Each country imposes tariffs on others strategically. In this light the difficulties oftheMTS
have a reasonable explanation. Theunwillingness of countries to agree to multilateral free trade is neither
irrational nor a coordination problem. It is a rational response to economic incentives of countries with
market power.
One immediate implication is that, under traditional conditions, regional trade blocs which
increase the market power ofthe market participants will naturally lead to tariff wars . The larger is the
market power ofa trade bloc, the larger is its incentive to impose tariffs on others . Even after retaliatory
moves are taken into account the same proposition holds: the larger the market power of the bloc, the
greater is its possible gain from a tariff war. Therefore ifthe formation ofregional tradeblocs increases
the market power ofthe participants, the creation of regional free trade zones encourages trade wars.Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
We have remarked that the results on optimal tariffs and on the optimal tariffs equilibria hold
under traditional assumptions. Since each of these results predicts that regional free trade zones create
incentives against global free trade, it becomes crucial to examine therole ofthese traditional assumptions
closely. For whenever these conditions are satisfied, regional free trade inevitably leads to trade wars.
And the larger the free trade zones, the more likely is that they will lead to trade wars .
We shall examine these conditions in some detail in the next section. This examination will be
conceptual, but focused on particular cases of immediate interest. Drawing on classical results on tariffs
of A.
￿
Lerner (1936) and of L. Metzler (1949), and on new results on trading blocs with economies of
scale Chichilnisky (1992) reported also in the Appendix, we shall show that if the blocs are organized
internally around the principle of economies of scale, the optimal tariff theorem breaks down. This
means that, under conditions of increasing returns, it is not true that a country is better off by the
unilateral imposition of a positive tariff on its imports.
￿
But before we turn to the new results, we shall
explore the implications of the optimal tariff theorem on the European Community and on NAFTA.
We shall argue that trade patterns can be based on traditional comparative advantages or on
economies of scale. It is to a large extent a matter of policy choice. The trade policies within a trade
bloc determine the extent to which the trade bloc will aid or hinder global free trade. The argument for
this result, and its implications for trade policy, occupy the rest of this paper.
EC and NAFTA
We now turn to the possible motivation for the United States to form a free trade zone with its
neighbors. The argument uses simple strategic considerations based on the results discussed in the
previous section. NAFTA-and any further extension to a larger free trade zone in the Americas-can
be seen as a strategic response by the U.S. to the creation of the European Community.
￿
The European
Community is a free trade zone with a quarter of world output. In seeking to form a trading bloc with
its natural trading partners in the Americas, the US appears to respond to the creation of more market
power, with an attempt to create more market power.
￿
This is a rational response if the US expects a
united Europe to impose tariffs on the rest of the world.
￿
The emergence of a region with increased
market power generally provides an incentive to other regions to seek similar status.
More explanatory power still can be extracted from the results ofKennan and Riezman [12][13]
and Riezman (1985) on who wins trade wars. Following the creation of a custom union, the incentives
are to create or join another free trade zone, but not at random.
￿
The economic incentive is to join
another free trade zone with the largest possible market power. This result allows us to predict that the
US should not only seek a free trade deal with Canada, but one with as many countries in the Americas
as possible. The aim is to reach market power which exceeds that of a unified Europe.
Trade Creation and Diversion
Once a new free trade zone is created, how do we measure the gains and losses from trade? A
naive view is that since free trade in competitive markets is Pareto efficient, any move towards free trade
is positive. As we saw, this would not be correct. We argued that regional trade blocs, being larger than
their components, will have more market power and therefore an incentive to impose tariffs against
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outsiders under traditional conditions . Therefore one of the first negative effects of the formation of a
trading bloc is that it canhurt the countries outside these areas. We shall argue below that these negative
effects can be mitigated ifthe trading patterns within the blocs are organized around economies ofscale.
But are the damages of free trade zones limited to protectionism with the rest of the world? The
answer to this question is generally no. There is a second danger in the formation of regional trade
blocs. Even if the trading blocs are not accompanied by increased protectionism against the rest of the
world, they can still lead to trade diversion. This means that a regional free trade bloc may lead to the
wrong specialization within the bloc. The classical argument about trade diversion is found in Viner
(1950), whose work remains a benchmark of analysis of preferential trade agreements. We shall
summarize his argument here in order to show that, if trade within the blocs is organized around
economies of scale, then Viner's argument breaks down. With economies of scale, the negative effect
of trade diversion can be mitigated.
Viner's point is that there are "trade creating" free trade zones, in which the increase in imports
by members from one another replaces domestic production. These are desirable. However, free trade
blocs could also be "trade diverting" in the case that imports are diverted from a lower cost source
outside the bloc to other sources inside thebloc which are less productive, but with more attractive prices
after the tariffs were selectively dropped.
The extra trade among the members of the trading bloc is, generally, an improvement ofwelfare.
The trade which is not additional but a diversion from efficient outside sources to less efficient insides
sources, lowers welfare. If northern Europe is induced by the entry of southern Europe, to buy oil from
Portugal rather than an equivalent from the US, and the US source is more efficient but less competitive
after the tariffs are dropped in Europe, there has been a welfare loss. Generally speaking Viner's
approach evaluates free trade zones by the extent to which more trade is created, rather than existing
trade diverted from one source to another.
Viner's original insight remains central to the analysis ofpreferential free trade zones.
￿
But, in
practice, it misses an important aspect .
￿
The increase size of the market can sometimes lead to more
efficiency and competitiveness. Even in thecases where Viner's analysis predicts welfare losses, namely
when the tradebloc diverts trade from outside sources to less competitive inside sources, welfare can still
increase with economies of scale.
Economies of scale can therefore have a major impact on trade policies. We shall argue in what
follows that they can also limit another major negative effect of a trading bloc: the incentives for large
blocs with market power to impose tariffs on others .
What does the empirical evidence show? It is widely believed that economies of scale were an
important factor in the success of the Treaty of Rome. Economies of scale were central to the success
of the European Common Market which was formed in 1958. While a strong possibility for trade
diversion existed a priori in the EC, in reality huge inter-industry trade emerged in manufactures. The
increase in market size and the associated rationalization in production led to efficiency gains which took
precedence over possible trade diversion. Krugman (1991) discusses this issue in some detail, without
however offering a conceptual relation between economies of scale and the economics of trading blocs.
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Hopes for largebenefits from both the US-Canadafreetrade agreement and Europe 1992
rest largely on an increase in competition and rationalization. In the North American
case, the estimate of Harris and Cox, which attempt to take account of competitive or
industrial organization effects, suggest a gain for Canada from free trade that is about
four times larger than those of standard models . In Europe the widely cited and
somewhat controversial figure of 7 percent gain due to 1992 presented in the Cechini
report Commission of the European Communities 1988 rests primarily on estimates by
Alisdair Smith and Anthony Venables of gains from increased competition and
rationalization.
Inpractice, therefore, economies ofscalecan eliminate trade diversionlosses, and transform these
into gains. I shall also argue below that they can also eliminate incentives for tariff wars between blocs,
so that the formation of trading blocs can become a parallel, complementary effort towards the
liberalization of world trade.
Intra- and Interbloc Trade
Although predictions are inherently dangerous in an area so circumscribed by political action, our
conclusion is that regional free trade can have different effects on global markets and it should be to a,-.
certain extent the choice of well informed and reasonable economic agents which one will prevail.
Regional trading blocs based ontraditional comparative advantages will generally divert trade. They will
also typicallyhinder theprospects ofglobal negotiations. Inthis case, as the bloc has more market power
than its parts, it has the incentive to impose larger tariffs on the rest of the world. Regional blocs then
develop incentives for imposing tariffs against each other, and for engaging in trade wars. This type of
regional free trade zone works against global free trade.
There is, however, an alternative.
￿
If the trade blocs expand trade based not on traditional
comparative advantagesbutrather on increasedproductive efficiency and competitiveness thatcomes with
economies of scale, matters could be quite different. In this latter case, the regional blocs could unleash
an appetite for further expansion of trade.
￿
We shall argue that in this case the incentive for blocs to
impose tariffs against each other is reduced, and in fact can be reversed by economic incentives in favor
of trade expansion which accompanies economies of scale.
￿
The creation of trading blocs which are
organized around economies of scale is therefore partof a broader trend towards increasingly openworld
markets.
The Americas: Traditional Comparative Advantages or Economies of Scale?
A central issue in our argument is the pattern of intrabloc trade.
￿
This issue is of particular
importance in an American free trade zone . -This is because ofall the regions, the American area is the
one whose trade is currently based on traditional comparative advantages and on the diversity among the
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The matter is not only one ofeconomic reality; it is also one ofperceived economic reality. Both
the European and the East Asian countries perceive gains from trade as a matter of exploiting economies
of scale.
￿
The newly industrialized countries in Asia, and the Japanese, have a dynamic vision of
comparative advantages. Moving up the ladder of comparative advantages in the production and trade
of skilled labor manufactures, of consumer electronics, and of products based on specialized knowledge
and on technological skill, are widespread priorities .
By contrast, within the sphere of influence of the United States, the vision of trade based on
traditional comparative advantages still prevails. It permeates to a great extent the thinking about
international trade at the government level, at the international organization level, at the academic, and
even at the journalist level.
The European free trade zone is, to a certain extent, a zone of equals .
￿
To encourage this
equality, the introduction of free mobility oflabor has been one of the first steps inthe European market
integration of 1992.
The Americas, on the other hand, have the U.S. as a hegemon, a "hub" which concentrates on
exporting manufactures and skill intensive goods to the "spokes" in exchange for their resources. The
free mobility of labor between the hub and the spokes is an unspoken issue.
￿
It has not even been
contemplated in the American negotiations for free trade.
￿
It has not been mentioned by any of the
governments concerned that labor could move freely between the free tradepartners, as it does in the EC
region. In some cases, quite to the contrary, the free trade agreement has been mentioned as a way to
limit the mobility of labor between the concerned countries.
To the extent that labor remains a fixed input ofproduction within the countries ofthe American
free trade zone, traditional comparative advantages based on labor will be invoked as a foundation for
policy . The concern is that an American free trade zone, ifit emerges, may reflect the historical patterns
of trade between industrial and developing regions, which is usually called North-South trade.
Traditional Comparative Advantages and the Global Environment
Another reason for concern with respect to traditional comparative advantages arises from the
current focus on the environment. Traditional comparative advantages emphasize the South's
concentration in the productionand export ofgoods which deplete environmental resources, such as wood
pulp and cash crops which overuse rain forests, or minerals whose combustion leads to the emission of
greenhouse gases. Recent work in the area ofNorth-South trade with environmental inputs to production
shows that ill defined patterns of property rights on forests, fisheries, and arable land in developing
countries may lead to a market-induced oversupply of goods which are intensive in the use of these
resources as inputs, and to Pareto inefficientpatterns ofinternational trade. What appears as comparative
advantages may simply be a reflection of a market failure in the developing countries. Social and private
comparative advantages differ and social and private gains from trade may also differ in these
circumstances. Traditional tax policies, levying duties on the use of such inputs in the South, may not
work, and may indeed lead to more extraction ofthe resource and more exports of the resource intensive
commodity. Indeed, it is shown in Chichilnisky that differences in property rights on inputs of
production are sufficient to explain the patterns of trade between nations.Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
The environment is another reason for being concerned with traditional comparative advantages
as a foundation for trade. Since two thirds ofthe current exports from Latin America are resources, and
the main trade ofEcuador, Venezuela and Mexico with the U.S. is petroleum, this problem is very real.
It is also very real with respect to trade in wood products which lead to the deforestation ofthe remaining
tropical forests.' Replacing traditional comparative advantages with economies of scale could be a
necessary feature of a program of sustainable development.
Skilled Labor and External Economies of Scale
It seems desirable at this point to distinguish an important difference between two types of
economies of scale: internal or external to the firm. The former are simply a reflection that each firm
may be more efficient in the use of its inputs to production as the level of its output increases.
￿
The
firm's per unit costs decrease with the level ofoutput . Such economies ofscale are typical of industries
which require large fixed costs, such as aerospace, airlines, and communications networks. This type
of increasing returns, called internal, can lead to monopolistic competition or other forms of limitations
to market entry. As such, there is a loss to the consumer in that the free market outcomes are typically
not Pareto efficient.
External economies of scale lead to a decrease in per unit costs as the output expands, but they
do so at the level of the industry or of the country as a whole. Each firm's production function faces
increasing cost per unit of output, i.e. decreasing returns to scale, which assures competitive behavior.
However, as the industry as a whole expands, externalities are created which lead to increased
productivity for all the firms. A good example is provided by the electronics industry . Each computer
manufacturer faces a rather competitive market. On the other hand, as the overall level of output of the
industry expands, knowledge about new technologies develops and this new knowledge, which is easily
and rapidly diffused across the industry, leads to lower costs for all. Just about any industry which
depends heavily on knowledge has this characteristic . In reality, the factor which leads to increasing
returns is the skill ofthe labor force which embodies knowledge. Knowledge is typically diffused and
can be captured and imitated sooner or later, and there are abundant examples in the software and
hardware industry to prove this point.' Knowledge creates skilled labor, and this in turn leads to
increasing returns to scale, which usually, although not always, are external to the firm. Because ofthis
skilled labor can simultaneously lead to economies ofscale, and to competitive markets. The successful
development experience of Korea, of Taiwan, and more recently of the Asian Tigers, shows that
export-led policies based on skilled labor intensive goods, for example in consumer electronics, is
generally more successful than those intensive inthe use of inexpensive and uneducated labor. This point
was developed formally in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986) and more recently in terms ofdevelopment policies
in Dadzie (1991) .
This paper will concentrate on external economies of scale, which are closely connected with
production systems based on skilled labor.
1. See Amelung (1991), Barbier et al. (1991), Brinkley and Vincent (1990), and Hyde and Neuman
(1991) .
2. Microsoft's Windows excellent imitation of the Apple operating system was tested in U.S. courts
and'found without fault.
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It was noted above that a large country will typically impose tariffs so as to improve its terms
oftrade. In doing so it typically introduces distortions in its production and consumption. Here we shall
show in a simple example how under traditional assumptions there is a tariff that improves welfare, in
the sense that the gains from improved terms oftrade exceed the losses from distortions. The analysis
is completely standard, see e.g., Krugman and Obsfelt (1988), but it is included here in order to
highlight the differences which arise in economies with increasing returns to scale. This is discussed in
the next section.
The analysis in this section relies on one assumption and one simplification. Both are relaxed
in the Appendix, which considers the general case. The assumption here is that the supply and demand
curves of the economy are linear and exhibit decreasing returns to scale, and that there are no major
income effects.
￿
The simplification is to neglect the impact of the tariff revenues on income; this is
typically done in textbooks, and will also be done in this section. It is however explicitly analyzed in the
Appendix .
We assume that the home country Hhas a demand curve with equation
where P is the domestic price of the good, and a supply curve
Country H's demand for imports is the difference,




(Q* - D*) = g + hp,
￿
(4)
where p,, is the world price. The internal price in country H exceeds the world price by the tariff:




Solving equation (6) for t = 0 gives pf, the world price that would prevail without tariffs. Then a
tariff t alters the internal price to:
p=pf +thl(b+f+h),
￿
(7)and the world price to
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pw =pt - t(b +f)1(b +f + h)
Note that if the parameters a, e, b, h andfare all positive, then
pf < p andp,, > pf,
implying that the tariff raises the internal price ,5 and lowers the world price p,v.
It is clear that under these conditions it is always possible to find a tariff t that increases the
country's welfare. Let q, and d, be the free trade levels of consumption and production. Since the






q2 = q,+tfhl(b+f+h) (10)
d2 = d, - tbhl(b+f+h).
￿
(11)
The gain in welfare from a lower world price is the area of the rectangle in Figure 3, the fall
in the price multiplied by the level of imports after the tariff:
gain in welfare = (d2 - q) x t(b + fil(b + f + h) =
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The loss from distorted consumption and production is the sum of the areas of the two triangles
in Figure l:
loss in welfare = (112) x (q2 - q,) x (P -,pf) + (112) x (d, - d2) x (P - pf) =
Optimal Tariffs with Economies of Scale
t2 x (b+f)xh212(b +f+h)2.
￿
(13)
gain - loss = t x U - tz x V.
￿
(14)
where Uand Vare constants. The net effect is the sum of a positive number times the tariff rate and a
negative number times the square of the tariff rate.
￿
It follows that when the tariff is sufficiently small
the net effect must be positive, since tz is smaller than t for values of t near zero.
￿
This establishes that,
when supply and demand are linear, income effects of the tariff income are neglected, and tariffs are
small, there exists a positive tariff which increases the welfare of the country beyond that which can be
obtained in free trade.
The size of the country matters. Ifthe importing country is small, then foreign supply is highly
elastic, i.e., h is very large, so from (8) we verify that the tariff has little or no effect on world prices
p,,, while raising domestic prices P almost one to one.
The argument in the previous section shows that a large country is better offby imposing tariffs
than it is under free trade. This proposition holds under traditional conditions, one of which is that the
supply of goods should increase with prices across market equilibria. In our example, this is formalized
by the parameters in the supply function in equation (2), which is upward sloping. However, this
assumption ceases to be valid with economies of scale. In such economies, the larger is the output the
lower are the costs, and therefore, in principle, the lower are the prices. Thenf < 0 in equation (8),
which in turn can lead to a negative welfare gain from the tariff from equation (12).
A good example of this phenomenon is provided by the electronics industry, for example
computer hardware. The last fifteen years have seen a dramatic decrease in prices together with a
dramatic expansion of output of computer hardware. This occurs because the expansion in output leads
to rationalization andthe corresponding increased efficiency inproduction. In the hardware industry this
takes the form of technological change which improves productive efficiency and lowers the costs of the
industry as a whole. Even though a technological breakthrough may in principle be patented, and
therefore could be captured by one firm with the corresponding increase in its market power and
deviation from competitive behavior, in practice the computer industry is very competitive. This is
because the knowledge which drives the technological innovation in this industry is easily diffused .
A standard textbook analysis of such economies of scale can be found in Nicholson (1978,
pp. 252-255), who documents that most studies of long-run cost curves have found that average costs
decrease until they become constant. Examples provided areagriculture, electricity generation, railroads,
and commercial banking, all activities which are broadly associated with economic development. The
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same textbook analysis explains how competitive markets can lead to a negative association of quantities
and prices across equilibria. This was the content of the famous debate in the 1920s between
J. H. Clapham, A. C. Pigou and D. H. Roberston, which was resolved positively, and which appeared
in the Economic Journal between 1922 and 1924.3 Chichilnisky and Heal (1987) discussed in some detail
the policy implications of international trade in economies with increasing returns to scale in a report on
trade policies in the 1980s to the Secretary General of UNCTAD, and they arrive to similar conclusions.
The analysis of optimal tariffs in the last section breaks down when there are increasing returns
to scale. In such economies there may be no gains from imposing tariffs, even ifthe country is large and
has substantial market power. It will be useful to illustrate how this happens in a concrete case.
￿
Recall
how tariffs increase welfare in the economy ofthe previous section. Tariffs increase welfare by lowering
the world prices p,,: this was seen in equation (7). The country's terms of trade thus improve after the
tariff. It imports fewer lower cost goods from the rest of the world. The welfare gains were computed
in equation (12), which depend crucially on the fact that, after the tariff, the consumers pay lower prices
for the goods they import.
However, this argument no longer holds with economies of scale. With economies of scale the
world price may increase rather than decrease after the tariff. The welfare gains from tariffs are the drop
in world prices times the quantity imported. But ifthe world price increases, the gains are transformed
into losses .
The possibility that after a tariff the terms of trade deteriorate for the country was studied in
Lerner (1936) and in Metzler (1949) . They argue mostly in terms of income effects. A similar
phenomenon occurs in our economy, but due to different causes. In contrast with the economy of the
previous section, the parameter f in equation (8) is now negative rather than positive; this means that
across equilibria the prices drop as quantities increase, or otherwise said, price increase when quantities
drop . If the tariff decreases the quantity produced and traded, this will lower the productive efficiency
of the economy. Costs increase and therefore prices increase too. The tariff defeats the gains from
rationalization in production produced by the larger market size. This is represented in Figure 2 below.
It shows a negative correlation between market clearing prices and the quantity of goods sold at an
equilibrium, and how this leads to an increase in the world prices after the tariff, corresponding to a
decrease in output.
After the tariff, the world price p,v canbe higher rather than lower as it is in the traditional case
with decreasing returns to scale. The terms of trade for the country are therefore worse after the tariff.
Consumers in the country are worse off because the price of their imports have increased. All of this
is formally reflected in the systems of equations presented above.
￿
In equation (7) the parameter f
describing the relation between supply and prices, which was previously positive, is now negative. In
practical terms the following conditions are sufficient for the world price to increase rather than decrease
after the tariff:








f < 0, and b and h > 0
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Pw
Figure 2




After the tariff, the world price pw increases
due to economies of scale
These conditions are satisfied under a variety of circumstances.
￿
For example (15) holds when
foreign export supply increases with, and is highly responsive to, prices (h > 0 and large), a reasonable
assumption for the world, when the country has increasing returns to scale (f < O) and the quantity
produced is more responsive to price than is the demand (b > O, b <
￿
I f I ).
The main condition is the existence of economies ofscale in the economy (f < O). Under these
conditions, the optimal tariff theorem is no longer true, as the countries may have no economic incentive
to impose tariffs on others and they loose by restricting trade.
Consumer electronics, semiconductors, software production, banking and financial services, and
just about any sector whose productivity depends mostly on knowledge and information have these
characteristics. Software production is today actively developed in India as an export business. It is a
sector which is simultaneously labor intensive and subject to informational economies of scale. As
already discussed, the remarkable economic development of the Asian Tigers over the last fifteen years





This" sector is simultaneously labor intensive and subject to informational
economies of scale.
All the arguments just presented hold equally for countries or for trading blocs. To the extent
that sectors with economies of scale expand within the free trade zone, the zone itself loses its economic
incentives to use its market power to restrict trade and wage tariff wars against others .
III. Conclusions
Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
The formation oftradingblocs typically harms the global liberalization ofmarkets when the blocs
are themselves organized under the principle of traditional comparative advantages. Under these
conditions, the larger the market power of the bloc the larger are its incentives to impose tariffs on
others . Protectionism emerges from the increased market power of the traders.
Retaliation can lead to a tariff war between blocs. Furthermore under traditional assumptions,
the larger country wins the tariff war. Therefore the larger the trading bloc, the more likely it is to
impose tariffs and to win a trade war.
Trading blocs ofthis nature have no economic incentive to favor the negotiations under the MTS.
They are better off with tariffs than with free trade. Indeed, the economic incentives of such trading
blocs are contrary to the GATT's intentions. This explains, to a certain extent, the slow pace ofGATT
negotiations.
The EC bloc was contrasted with NAFTA or with an eventual American free trade zone . The
empirical evidence suggests that the EC trading bloc benefitted from increasing returns to scale.
NAFTA and any eventual WHFTA emerged as astrategic response to the increase market power
of the European trading bloc. By contrast with the EC trading bloc, the emerging NAFTA appears to
be organizing under the traditional theory of comparative advantage.
The lack ofprovision for the mobility of labor between the countries ofthe region reinforces this
trend. NAFTA does not contemplate the mobility of labor between Mexico and the U.S. The lack of
labor mobility tends to lock in the traditional comparative advantages between the countries within the
area. Theirtrading on the basis ofcomparative advantages within the bloc will create incentives for trade
wars between blocs.
A different scenario contemplates a NAFTA organized around economies ofscale. Examples for
such scenarios include Indian software trade, andtheAsian Tigers' specialization inconsumer electronics.
Typically, electronic-based industries have increasing returns derived from the creation and diffusion of
knowledge as output expands. This leads to rationalization in production and to increased efficiency and
thus lower costs. The expansionof output is accompanied-by lower rather than higher prices. From the
point ofview of the exporter, these markets are less likely to be protected because the importer, having
increasing returns to scale in this industry, has less incentives to rely on tariffs than it does in other
industries with decreasing returns. With increasing returns, tariffs decrease trade and can increase world
prices, thus decreasing the welfare of the importing country. Economies of scale produce incentives to
expand trade.
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The issue is formalized by showingthat economies ofscale change the standard result of optimal
tariffs. While under traditional conditions, a trading bloc is always better off with tariffs than it is with
free trade, we showed that with increasing returns to scale this is no longer true. Tariffs decrease the
size of the market, and therefore decrease productive efficiency in economies with increasing returns.
This decrease in efficiency leads to larger rather than lower world prices, and the main purpose of the
tariff, which is to improve the countries' terms oftrade,'is defeated. Under these conditions trading blocs
are better of with free trade, and with the corresponding expanded markets, than they are with tariffs.
To the extent that NAFTA organizes itself around economies of scale inthe international trade within the
region, the incentives for a trade war between NAFTA and the EC are mitigated.
It seems useful to remind ourselves that the choice of products and of technology are to a large
extent the subject of policy. They need in no way interfere with market efficiency. The first welfare
theorem about the efficiency of competitive markets applies to amarket with given technologies and with
given products.
￿
The theorem does not explain how different technologies or products arise:
￿
it proves
that once technologies and products are given, competitive markets lead to Pareto efficiency. Once the
product mix and the technologies are chosen the market can operate efficiently. This implies that the
organizing principles within the blocs-traditional comparative advantages or economies of scale-are,
to a great extent, a matter of policy choice.
￿
Choosing different trade policies, for example, choosing
technologies andtheproduct mix, can be achieved without market distortions or loss ofmarket efficiency.
This point was already made by Meade (1971) .
The emergence of an American trading bloc which reinforces the current tendency towards the
exploitation of traditional comparative advantages is a source of concern. It has been argued in
Chichilnisky (1981, 1986, 1987) that export led policies based on (unskilled) labor intensive products can
defeat the goals of development and trade by depressing the country's terms of trade and overall
consumption. Trade between the countries of the Americas is organized today around traditional
comparative advantages: labor and resource intensive exports from the South and capital and
skill-intensive exports from the North. Ifthe emergence ofaWHFTA is based on similar principles, then
not only may this continue a depressing growth trend in Latin America, but in addition it could create
or reinforce incentives against the global liberalization of free trade.
We have argued that another reason to avoid tradepolicies between the countries ofthe Americas
based on traditional comparative advantages is that they tend to deplete environmental assets such as
forests, fisheries or fertile land, and overuse minerals which are exported by the developing countries to
the North. Some of these minerals are the source of potentially dangerous COZ emissions. Petroleum
exported from Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela to the United States fits this description. Indeed, any
concept of sustainable development requires a rethinking of trade policies away from those based on
comparative advantages. This general premise is particularly well suited to the NAFTA, and for the
Americas as a whole, since two thirds of Latin American exports today are resources.
The main point of this paper is that the characteristics oftrading policies within the trading blocs
can determine the extent to which the blocs will favor or harm the global negotiations towards free trade.
Trading policies based on comparative advantages are generally negative towards the GATT. We argued
that trading policies based on economies of scale could have a positive effect towards global free trade:
by mitigating the economic incentive oftrade restrictions in favor of an expansion of world trade. The
emergence of such trading blocs could advance in tandem with the liberalization of world trade.
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Appendix: Trading Blocs with Increasing Returns to Scale
This appendix develops an international trade model and proves formally the propositions on
customs unions stated in the body of the paper.
Themodel presentedhere extends the North-Southmodel introduced in Chichilnisky (1981, 1986,
1987) to the case of economies which trade in goods produced under conditions of increasing returns to
scale, and proves formally the proposition that with increasing returns to scale, large countries can
achieve higher welfare levels with free trade than with tariffs. This model considers Cobb-Douglas
production functions, and it assumes that there exist economies of scale in production which are external
to the firm, such as in the example of the electronic industry discussed in the text. The model describes
two countries, 1 and 2, producing and trading two goods B (basic goods) and I (industrial goods) with
each other; these goods are produced using two inputs, labor (L) and capital (K). The economies of the
two countries are competitive, so that in each country prices are taken as given by consumers and
producers. Producers maximize profits, and consumers maximize utility subject to their budget
constraints. Walras Law is satisfied, so that the value of the excess demand is equal to zero.
￿
At an
equilibrium, goods and factors markets clear.
The increasing returns to scale considered here are "external" to the firm.
￿
This means that in
the production functions, formalized below, there exists a parameter denoted y which increases with the
level of output ofthe economy. As the outputs of the economy expand, the production function varies,
formalizing the notion that factors are more productive at higher levels of aggregate output. However,
the firm takes this parameter y as given-this is the assumption that the increasing returns are external
to the firm. For each given value of the parameter y the firm has constant returns to scale. The firms
are therefore competitive, and in particular zero profits are achieved at an equilibrium.





where a, /3 e (0, 1), y is a positive parameter, LI and K, are the inputs oflabor and capital inthe B sector,
andLZ and KZ the inputs of labor and capital in the I sector. The total amount of labor and capital in the
economy are LS and KS, respectively. Prices arepa and p,; we assume that I is the numeraire so that
Pr = 1 . (17)
Factor prices are denoted as usual: w for wages and r for rental on capital. We shall assume for
simplicity that the demand for basic goods at an equilibrium is known:
so that by Walras Law the demand for industrial goods in equilibrium is given by
Id = (wL' -1- rK' - PBBd),
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because of zero profits.
￿
More general demand functions than those postulated in (18) can be given
without a major effect on the results, see for example the various forms of demand functions utilized in
Chichilnisky (1986).
￿
Indicating the equilibrium level of exports by XI*, and the equilibrium level of
imports byXs , the model ofthe world economy is formalizedby the following equilibrium conditions :
peB'* -1- I* = w*L* -1- rK* )(zero profits)
K* = K' = KI -t- K2 (capital market clears)
L* = L' = L1 + L2 (labor market clears)
B'* = Bd* + XB (B market clears)
Id* = I'* -#- XI* (I market clears)
The model for the world economy consists of two countries, indicated with the indices 1 and 2,
each specified as above. To solve the model, there are therefore five prices to be determined : the "terms
of trade" PB, and two factor prices in each country, w and r.
￿
The quantities to be determined in an
equilibrium are: the use of factors in each sector of each country: K,, K2, L1, L2, the outputs ofthe two
goods BS and F, and the corresponding parameter y determining the external economies of scale, the
exports and imports of each of the two goods in each of the two countries, X
￿
and X , and the demand
for each good in each country, B` and Id`.
￿
There is a total of 27 variables to be determined
endogenously, including all prices and quantities in all markets and both countries.
In the following proposition 1 we shall prove that all of these variables can be determined once
the variable giving the terms of trade in equilibrium pB is known. Further, we shall prove that there
exists one "resolving equation" that determines the equilibrium value of the terms oftrade as a function
ofall the exogenous parameters ofthe model, ofwhich there are six in each country: cx, a, a, Bd", LS and
K, and a total of 12 in the world economy.
The Effects of a Tariff on Terms of Trade
Proposition l : Ifthe importing country 1 has external economies ofscale,
y = -yB = B°, a > 1
(20)
andtheforeign supply is highly elastic (8XB218PB >0 andvery large) then no tariffcan increase
the welfare ofthe country relative to that which the country can achieve underfree trade.
Consider a world economy with two countries defined as in equations (16) (17) (18) (19) (20).
We shall now solve the model by finding an explicit expression for the equilibrium terms of trade pa in
the world economy.
￿
This consists of writing the market clearing conditions in the B market, exports
equal imports, and expressing it as a function of one variable : pB.
￿
From the terms of trade in
equilibrium, we show that all other endogenous variables can be found. We shall use the indices 1 andTrade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
2 to distinguish the parameters of the two countries.
￿
Note first that we have given no specification of
demand or supply behavior outside of an equilibrium; in particular, there is no information for carrying
out stability analysis. Since the model has constant returns to scale, profit maximizing supply functions
are, as is standard, undefined. As is standard in models with constant returns to scale, we derive the
equilibrium relations between supplies and prices from the condition of full employment of factors






Since by assumption each firm takes the parameter y as given, from the production functions (16),
marginal conditions and zero profits imply:
The next step is to define an equation (called the "resolving equation" and denoted F = 0) which yields
the equilibrium value of the terms oftrade PB as a function ofall the exogenous parameters ofthe model
of which there are 12 as listed above, and from which all other endogenous variables at equilibrium are
explicitly computed.
182
W = '7a(Ll IKl)°`-1PB = -tali-1PB
r = 'Y(1 - a)liPB
,W = -1Qlz-1 (21)





and = [(1 -Q)]1
w a w Q (22)
- li ~(1 Aa
]
-
12. [Q(1 -a)] (23)








all+(1-a)+PB=A+(1-Q)Strategies for Trade Liberalization in the Americas
or, equivalently,
(a - 1)11+(1 - 0)12=Q - PB - a
all-( .312=(1-Q)-PB-(1-a). (26)
Solving for 11,12 gives:




[(a pB - (1 - a)] - [(Q pB =
P _ a] (28)
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which together with (30) gives the levels of supply of labor and capital used in each sector, at an

















Expressions (16) and (36) give the quantity ofBand Iproduced at each level of relative prices,pa. Now
taking y = l, we denote these as O(PB) and respectively . Therefore from (16) we obtain the




Note that this does not fully express outputs as an explicit function of equilibrium prices because y =
y(B) . To obtain outputs as explicit functions of equilibrium prices we must also find out the equilibrium
value of y = y*(B), which is a "fixed point" problem, since y depends on B and B depends on 'Y. This
is solved as follows.
Now,
e -
12 = K L' - = - = - e ~1)
Li 12(K° K1) or L1 P- 12(K' K1) (31)
-
and
11 = LI/KI =:~- Ll = 11K1 so that P- 12(Ke - Kl) = 11K1 (32)
or K1(11 - 12) = L' -12K' =* Kl = (L' -12K')/(Il -12).
(33)
From (13), (32), and (33) we obtain:







(Le -12Ke) (35)The economy has increasing returns which are external to the firm, and the parameter -y increases with




At an equilibrium, equations (38) and (39) must be satisfied simultaneously, i.e.,
-Y = [rO(PB)l
(40)
= y"O(PB)°, or 'Y' = O(PB)a
so that
Therefore at an equilibrium from (38) we obtain a relation between the outputs of B and I, and pB:
If «-l,8--oo .
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Note that when a > 1, B = a + 1/1-a < 0 so that when BS = 0(pB)°+"('-°) decreases with PB across
equilibria, since O(PB) is an increasing function ofPB for each fixed -y, see Figure 3.
To solve the model we now consider the market clearing condition in B. At a world equilibrium, the B
market must clear so that:
B','





F(PB, t) = Bdj (PB + t) - B3,1 (PB + t) - B s,2 (PB) + Bd,2(PB) = 0.
￿
(42)
From (18) (19) (21) (30) and (41), equation (42) is a function of the variable pB alone, which we call a
reduced form "resolving" equation for this model. Solving this equation gives the equilibrium values of
PB from where all other variables can be computed as shown above. The model is thus solved.










- B-,11a(PB + t)
aBd,l/a(PB + t) + OBd,21apB - OB-lla(pB + t) - OBs,21aPB
(41)
(43)
By the assumptions on demand for B, if al > 1, then BB"'/S(pB + t) < 0 and therefore the numerator
of (43) is negative. The denominator is also negative, so that SP ./St > O. As the tariff t increases, PB
also increases. The terms of trade of the country decrease, since it imports B and must now pay more
for it, as we set out to prove.Trade Liberalization in the Western Hemisphere
Figure 3
Each firm faces an upward cost curve . The country as a
whole faces a downward cost curve due to
external economies of scale .
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